Boeing 737 Max

[I-5]

You make a good point, but I don't see the point of being comfortable. I'd rather know the reality, which in some cases is definitely pilot error. There are multiple examples of that. It does not look that way here.

[RiverDog]

You make a good point, but I don't see the point of being comfortable. I'd rather know the reality, which in some cases is definitely pilot error. There are multiple examples of that. It does not look that way here.

Oh, I'm not comfortable at all. IMO Boeing, the FAA, and individual airlines all have blood on their hands, and they need to be held accountable.

But they still need to explain the knowledge difference between the pilots at Lion Air. Why did one pilot know how to rectify the problem and the others didn't? Did just that one pilot have access to exclusive information that allowed him to successfully fly the plane? How did he come about that knowledge and the other pilots not?

[I-5]

Yeah, we still don't know why that off-duty pilot on the other flight was able to save them. It's equally troubling that the on duty pilots on the previous flight had the same problem and couldn't solve it.

Having said that, there is no way to know if the knowledgeable pilot could have saved the Ethiopian Air flight, unless he knew something that even Boeing didn't know, since the Ethiopian pilots followed their training they were given according to the report.

[I-5]

Without a doubt, if Boeing hadn't found a loophole to rush to market by calling the Max the 'same plane' as the 737 NG by justifying using the same airframe, then the certification process would have followed that path of a brand new plane, which would have taken longer, but would have been more thorough, which also means the pilots would have had more training than a 1.5 hour iPad lesson. I don't think that is really a question.

[RiverDog]

Yeah, we still don't know why that off-duty pilot on the other flight was able to save them. It's equally troubling that the on duty pilots on the previous flight had the same problem and couldn't solve it.

Having said that, there is no way to know if the knowledgeable pilot could have saved the Ethiopian Air flight, unless he knew something that even Boeing didn't know, since the Ethiopian pilots followed their training they were given according to the report.

I read about the pilots in the Ethiopian Air crash having followed the prescribed checklist this morning, so something isn't adding up. The off duty pilot that knew how to rectify the problem had to have either discovered it by trial and error...highly unlikely considering how complicated the cockpit controls are...or he came about the information through some sort of documentation he read or some unique information shared only with him by another employee, the manufacturer, or the airline. Hopefully the investigators are talking with the off duty pilot and asking him those questions.

When the controversy first surfaced, I saw a pilot demonstrate how to disable the MCAS system, by throwing a simple two position switch located near the throttle. I assume that's the switch that the off duty pilot knew about that the others didn't, and that switch is not included in the checklist noted in the report on the Ethiopian Air crash.

We'll have to wait until the investigation is complete and the final, official report is issued.

Edit: I just saw a report where the pilots of the Ethiopian Air crash did disable the MCAS system per checklist but turned it back on again before the crash. The reporter indicated that had they simply slowed down that the plane would have been more maneuverable and they could have saved the aircraft. If that report is true, then operational error, whether that be pilot error, lack of training, incomplete checklist, or a combination of those factors, would seem to be part of the equation.

[I-5]

It’s not as simple as throwing switches; if you read the link I posted, the former Boeing engineer talks about the extreme forces that a 40 degree dive (which was documented on the Ethiopian flight) and the extreme airspeed (in excess of 500 kts) would have put on the stabilizer could make it physically impossible to counter it. We don’t know that the Lion Air flight that survived got into a dive that extreme.

[RiverDog]

It’s not as simple as throwing switches; if you read the link I posted, the former Boeing engineer talks about the extreme forces that a 40 degree dive (which was documented on the Ethiopian flight) and the extreme airspeed (in excess of 500 kts) would have put on the stabilizer could make it physically impossible to counter it. We don’t know that the Lion Air flight that survived got into a dive that extreme.

They're still not sure whether or not the crew did all they were supposed to:

Questions have also been raised over whether crew followed guidance not to restore power to a troublesome anti-stall system following the sensor damage, possibly caused by a bird strike. The plane was also set to unusually high thrust, data suggested.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethi ... sinessNews

The TV report I just saw, on NBC (sorry, no link), questioned why the pilots restored power to MCAS after they had disabled it per checklist and suggested that all they had to do to stabilize the craft was to reduce their unusually high air speed...as you noted, in excess of 500 kts...and they could have landed safely.

If past accidents are any indication of the ultimate cause of these two crashes, the cause will more than likely include a number of factors of which several could have prevented the disaster. We'll see what they come up with.

[I-5]

You're right, that with airplane crashes, it's never one thing; it's always a string of events that lead to a crash. For example, the Aeroflot flight that crashed because one of the pilots let his kid sit in the captain's chair, had the crew not tried to counter the turn that the kid made while they weren't looking until it was too late, the plane would have righted itself in autopilot mode, and all the other things they did that actually made it worse.

To Muillenberg's credit, he mentioned these factors that they own and will remove so that they will never be a factor again:

1) the fact Boeing decided MCAS only needed data from 1 sensor instead of 2, even though every plane already has 2
2) the software decision to not let MCAS reset after an input from the pilot, so that MCAS wouldn't automatically kick back in (it was kicking back in every time, making the dives steeper and faster)
3) the decision by Boeing to offer a disagree warning light as an option instead of as standard

The last one is ridiculous...imagine offering a car with seat belts as an option. That's why capitalism needs regulations.

[RiverDog]

You're right, that with airplane crashes, it's never one thing; it's always a string of events that lead to a crash. For example, the Aeroflot flight that crashed because one of the pilots let his kid sit in the captain's chair, had the crew not tried to counter the turn that the kid made while they weren't looking until it was too late, the plane would have righted itself in autopilot mode, and all the other things they did that actually made it worse.

To Muillenberg's credit, he mentioned these factors that they own and will remove so that they will never be a factor again:

1) the fact Boeing decided MCAS only needed data from 1 sensor instead of 2, even though every plane already has 2
2) the software decision to not let MCAS reset after an input from the pilot, so that MCAS wouldn't automatically kick back in (it was kicking back in every time, making the dives steeper and faster)
3) the decision by Boeing to offer a disagree warning light as an option instead of as standard

The last one is ridiculous...imagine offering a car with seat belts as an option. That's why capitalism needs regulations.

It's becoming pretty clear that pilot error was one of the major causes of the Ethiopian Air crash as they were flying much faster than they should have been, never attempted to reduce their speed, and re-engaged the faulty MCAS system when they had successfully disabled it. It's odd as the pilot was very experienced.

Actually all those points are pretty ridiculous. Even a layman can see the fallacy of relying on one data point or a system that constantly overrides a pilot's attempt to take manual control.

I, too, was impressed with the CEO's statement. The only problem is that he was a day late and a dollar short. It was only when the issue was thrust in their face that they reacted.

[I-5]

Yep. Just one disagreement: the pilots didn’t increase their airspeed voluntarily; MCAS did by virtue of the repeated node down attitude it kept activating.

[RiverDog]

Yep. Just one disagreement: the pilots didn’t increase their airspeed voluntarily; MCAS did by virtue of the repeated node down attitude it kept activating.

Problem is that even with the MCAS disabled, they did not try to reduce speed, or so it would appear from the reports.

[I-5]

The flight only last 6 minutes, everything they did was to get the nose up, which requires throttle. We’ll see when more comes out. In 70% of accidents it is pilot error, but I don’t see evidence of that here. They literally tried to follow every Boeing directive.

[RiverDog]

The flight only last 6 minutes, everything they did was to get the nose up, which requires throttle. We’ll see when more comes out. In 70% of accidents it is pilot error, but I don’t see evidence of that here. They literally tried to follow every Boeing directive.

So what about their re-energizing MCAS after they had shut it off? I don't know if leaving it off would have helped them recover the plane, but it wasn't part of Boeing's directive to turn it back on.

The reports I've witnessed seem to think that the pilots could have throttled back the speed but never attempted to do so.

But like you say, we'll have to wait and see the final report, but I strongly suspect that like nearly all accidents that there was a chain of events of which if any link in that chain had been broken, the accident wouldn't have happened.

[I-5]

From my understanding, MCAS isn't something you 'turn on', it's an automatic feature that kicks in on its own. We can go back and forth and what the pilots did to make it better or worse, but bottom line, they followed the training they were provided, literally for better or worse. One thing we can all agree on is that none of this would even be an issue if Boeing designed a better system for correcting trim, and provided for it in training.

[I-5]

This video does a good job of succinctly explaining the motivation behind the race to bring this plane to market, and how the system behaves (not just on the doomed flights). Yes, 2/3 of crashes are pilot error, but watch this before making assumptions about the Indonesian or Ethiopian crews:

https://youtu.be/H2tuKiiznsY

[RiverDog]

I think your instincts are better than mine on this issue, I-5. More and more bad stuff regarding Boeing's handling of problems surrounding this critical sensor are emerging:

The device linked to the Boeing 737 Max software that has been scrutinized after two deadly crashes was previously flagged in more than 200 incident reports submitted to the Federal Aviation Administration, but Boeing did not flight test a scenario in which it malfunctioned, CNN has learned.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/travel/news/b ... spartandhp

Boeing needs to clean house, fire some of these engineers and managers that were responsible for these SNAFU's. I don't like seeing people lose their jobs, but it's the only way for them to regain public confidence and start over with a completely new slate. The same thing needs to happen at the FAA, but since they're the government, they'll probably just transfer the guilty parties to some other department.

[I-5]

I've always loved Boeing, but somehow I don't recognize this is the same company that built the 747 or even the 777 (my two favourite aircraft in the skies). Starting with the the move of their corporate HQ to Chicago, to the way they gave up a lot of intellectual property in the design and engineering of the 787, and now the 737 Max, I don't think this is the same company anymore. I agree with you about the need to clean house, but I think the problem is probably much higher up the food chain than the engineers. Engineers aren't the ones that feel pressure from shareholders; it's the execs. I also have little faith in the workers they hired to build planes in their SC plant. I just came back from a trip to Asia that involved crossing the ocean in the 777, which is still a great plane, but I was really glad that our shorter connecting flights weren't on any 737's, Max or NG.

[RiverDog]

One of the weaknesses of our capitalistic system is that there are times that the most responsible individuals in a company, the executives and Board of Directors, are the last ones that are held accountable, or not held accountable at all. I am reminded of the recent scandal at Wells Fargo where lower level employees were opening bank accounts for customers that did not request them or had opted not to open one due to a company policy that rewarded loan officers and other junior employees that opened up new accounts.

I'm also reminded of the Challenger accident, where NASA became preoccupied by keeping to an unreasonable launch schedule and pressured managers at a contractor to sign off on a decision to launch when their engineers were strongly advising against it.

A similar dilemma exists at the FAA. It is clear that what is suppose to be a regulatory agency has turned into nothing more than a bunch of rubber stamps, allowing Boeing to essentially operate as they saw fit. But who do you hold accountable at the FAA?

I'm not sure what the answer is. How do you fire a Board of Directors when their only boss is spread out over 100K stockholders? The best that we can hope for is that all this bad publicity motivates Boeing and the FAA to heal themselves.

[burrrton]

One of the weaknesses of our capitalistic system is that there are times that the most responsible individuals in a company, the executives and Board of Directors, are the last ones that are held accountable, or not held accountable at all.

Agreed, but that's a weakness of every system (it's just different people not being held accountable for mistakes).

[I-5]

Riv, in both cases of Wells Fargo and NASA, logic says mid level managers and engineers don't have much incentive to do things that are improper without pressure coming from higher up.

I think Boeing has two dangers; execs trying to please shareholders by rushing planes to market, and two, poorly trained (from multiple accounts) workers, at least in the 787 plant and possibly other plants where debris and shoddy work has been discovered after they had been supposedly inspected.

From what I've read, the FAA suffers from lack of budgets and manpower, so it's not exactly the same type of capitalistic greed, but probably a by product of it.

[RiverDog]

Riv, in both cases of Wells Fargo and NASA, logic says mid level managers and engineers don't have much incentive to do things that are improper without pressure coming from higher up.

I think Boeing has two dangers; execs trying to please shareholders by rushing planes to market, and two, poorly trained (from multiple accounts) workers, at least in the 787 plant and possibly other plants where debris and shoddy work has been discovered after they had been supposedly inspected.

From what I've read, the FAA suffers from lack of budgets and manpower, so it's not exactly the same type of capitalistic greed, but probably a by product of it.

That's exactly what I was saying. When there's a widespread problem such as there was with Wells Fargo, NASA, and now Boeing, it doesn't "just happen". As the saying goes, a fish rots from the head down.

The only thing I'll add to your summary of the problem at the FAA is that Boeing is a virtual monopoly, and with only one entity to monitor, it's unavoidable that a cozy relationship between the umpire and the player starts to develop. You certainly don't see that kind of widespread relationship at some place like the USDA occurring where there are multiple different restaurants and food processors, indeed multiple different regulatory agencies (such as state health departments) that are subject to their jurisdiction.

[I-5]

If I was an engineer whose lives depended on my work, it would be a nightmare to think that I would also be the person to certify it. I would want the oversight from a third party who isn't under pressure to approve it. Unfortunately, this is not the current state as you pointed out. Probably the only people that don't mind it are, again, Boeing execs. I know there is a movement already to separate the roles of CEO and president at Boeing, since they are both occupied by the same person. Despite saying that, I doubt that heads will roll at Boeing or the FAA. I hope I'm wrong.

[RiverDog]

If I was an engineer whose lives depended on my work, it would be a nightmare to think that I would also be the person to certify it. I would want the oversight from a third party who isn't under pressure to approve it. Unfortunately, this is not the current state as you pointed out. Probably the only people that don't mind it are, again, Boeing execs. I know there is a movement already to separate the roles of CEO and president at Boeing, since they are both occupied by the same person. Despite saying that, I doubt that heads will roll at Boeing or the FAA. I hope I'm wrong.

I don't know how relative my experience during my 40 year career in middle management is to this situation with Boeing, but it seemed like when things started getting micro managed, in other words, upper managers becoming obsessed with tasks normally delegated to the lower part of the food chain, quality tends to suffer. Upper management is ALWAYS going to be concerned with profits and losses than they are with quality because their job function is more involved with finances than it is with quality, which tends to get lip service. Middle management seldom see the bigger financial picture and is more concerned with the task at hand. Additionally, lower level managers are motivated to agree with their superiors as they have aspirations of their own and want to be seen as a "team player" so many will reinforce upper management by telling them what they want to hear.

So, an honest question: Are Boeing execs micromanaging their engineers?

[I-5]

That’s an interesting question, Riv, and obviously we may never know if execs are micro managing engineers. From my experience working in a creative agency, micro managing comes in the form of not just WHAT to do, but HOW to do it (their way of course), which never leads to innovation and usually leads to poorer quality work when the lower level engineer or designer isn’t really trying to solve anything by then, but just make their manager happy. Now that I’m in a leader position, I’m applying what I learned by setting goals but leaving room for my team to come up with their own tactics and strategies to accomplish the goal.

In the case of Boeing, the goal was undoubtedly to get to market quickly to stop the blood letting to the Airbus A320 Neo, but someone high up also approved the decision to go with the problematic AoA sensor supplier, and the other decision to have the entire system rely on just one sensor, which seems reckless now (I’ve always been told that Boeing designs three levels of redundancy for critical systems - this will probably be classified as such moving forward).

Bottom line,I think you’re right.

[burrrton]

From my experience working in a creative agency, micro managing comes in the form of not just WHAT to do, but HOW to do it (their way of course)

Yup. In fact, that's kinda the definition of micromanagement. It's a manager's job to tell you what to do (generally speaking), but from there they should trust the professionals under them to know how to do it.

[RiverDog]

Yea, I think the issue of micromanaging is a common thread in most all organizations, particularly for-profit businesses. It's two different sub sets of employees with different priorities with one having veto power over the other.

If you guy ever get a chance, watch the 1 hour documentary "Challenger: A Rush to Launch"

[I-5]

I've never seen that documentary, but have read similar things about the Challenger explosion. It sounds very similar to what might have happened with the Max. Thanks for the rec.

[Hawktawk]

Quite by chance I found out one of the members of the country club for which I was employed had been on loan to NASA from Boeing as a payload expert during the challenger disaster. The guy couldn’t talk about it without crying. He knew every astronaut personally . He said management did everything they could to destroy he and the other specialists who prepared the craft for launch in order to save their own asses. Joe died a few years ago of lung cancer, a broken man. It seems to me this max deal is very similar . The main reason for this stall system was bolting on bigger engines and it was poorly conceived and rushed to market . Now we blame the pilots for letting a plane with larger engines get going too fast when they were fighting it from 400 feet altitude off the runway till
It crashed . Serious Monday morning quarterbacking . Sad

[I-5]

So sorry to hear about your friend, HawkTalk. It’s sad but not surprising at all that those who care the most would get blamed. If what you’re saying about bolting bigger engines to an airframe that wasn’t designed for them is the problem, then logic follows that whatever software solution they come up with is still problematic. I’m not flying on a Max for that reason (I always check which aircraft is specified when I book my flights). I’m not feeling to good about the 787 stories I’m hearing, either.

[I-5]

I'm sure you all read that during inspections, the FAA found an additional flaw within the 737 Max.

From Boeing's website:

"CHICAGO, June 26, 2019 – The safety of our airplanes is Boeing’s highest priority. During the FAA’s review of the 737 MAX software update and recent simulator sessions, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) identified an additional requirement that it has asked the company to address through the software changes that the company has been developing for the past eight months. The FAA review and process for returning the 737 MAX to passenger service are designed to result in a thorough and comprehensive assessment. Boeing agrees with the FAA's decision and request, and is working on the required software. Addressing this condition will reduce pilot workload by accounting for a potential source of uncommanded stabilizer motion. Boeing will not offer the 737 MAX for certification by the FAA until we have satisfied all requirements for certification of the MAX and its safe return to service."

https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2019-06-26 ... X-software

The good thing is that FAA looks like it's trying to establish itself again in its proper role. On the other hand, could Boeing do any worse than right now? I know some of us (myself included) originally thought we'd go on board a 737 Max, but I abandoned that idea a few months ago, and this news just guarantees it. I'm now a little more concerned about the other 737 models that might share similar components or software.

[RiverDog]

I'm sure you all read that during inspections, the FAA found an additional flaw within the 737 Max.

From Boeing's website:

"CHICAGO, June 26, 2019 – The safety of our airplanes is Boeing’s highest priority. During the FAA’s review of the 737 MAX software update and recent simulator sessions, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) identified an additional requirement that it has asked the company to address through the software changes that the company has been developing for the past eight months. The FAA review and process for returning the 737 MAX to passenger service are designed to result in a thorough and comprehensive assessment. Boeing agrees with the FAA's decision and request, and is working on the required software. Addressing this condition will reduce pilot workload by accounting for a potential source of uncommanded stabilizer motion. Boeing will not offer the 737 MAX for certification by the FAA until we have satisfied all requirements for certification of the MAX and its safe return to service."

https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2019-06-26 ... X-software

The good thing is that FAA looks like it's trying to establish itself again in its proper role. On the other hand, could Boeing do any worse than right now? I know some of us (myself included) originally thought we'd go on board a 737 Max, but I abandoned that idea a few months ago, and this news just guarantees it. I'm now a little more concerned about the other 737 models that might share similar components or software.

Both Boeing and the FAA have taken their lumps, so it's not unusual to see this type of reaction.

There's a lot more at stake between Boeing and the federal government. Boeing is a big defense contractor, and it's in our national best interest for them to remain a healthy, viable company. Additionally, they are a prime contractor for a lot of NASA projects. We don't want to be in the position of (excuse the overused cliché) throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

[I-5]

I'm not what throwing the baby out with the bathwater would entail in this situation. I'm not suggesting something needs to happen, just that it's good to see the FAA exercising some authority. Whether it's for show or not we don't know.

[I-5]

It's been a while since this OP, but I think I might be ready to say the 737 Max as currently designed from a hardware standpoint will never fly again. I just doubt that a software fix is all that's needed to right a very seriously flawed approach that made sense only to businessmen, not to aeronautical engineers (namely, using an old airframe for newer bigger engines to save on certification time). Not telling the airlines specifically about the MCAS to also save money on flight sim time also made it worse. And now this from CNN today:

"Congress also heard last week from a Boeing whistleblower who worked on the 737 Max and had urged managers to shut down the production line because of mistakes and cut corners. He said his recommendations fell on deaf ears. An FAA analysis dated December 2018 — weeks after the first crash — predicted there would be more than 15 additional fatal crashes of the Max over its lifetime. That document was made public at a House Transportation Committee hearing on Wednesday."

The Boeing we know and love is not today's Boeing in my book. That Boeing died when they decided to move the company HQ to Chicago, and that is when the problems with the 787 and 737 Max programs began.

[RiverDog]

It's been a while since this OP, but I think I might be ready to say the 737 Max as currently designed from a hardware standpoint will never fly again. I just doubt that a software fix is all that's needed to right a very seriously flawed approach that made sense only to businessmen, not to aeronautical engineers (namely, using an old airframe for newer bigger engines to save on certification time). Not telling the airlines specifically about the MCAS to also save money on flight sim time also made it worse. And now this from CNN today:

"Congress also heard last week from a Boeing whistleblower who worked on the 737 Max and had urged managers to shut down the production line because of mistakes and cut corners. He said his recommendations fell on deaf ears. An FAA analysis dated December 2018 — weeks after the first crash — predicted there would be more than 15 additional fatal crashes of the Max over its lifetime. That document was made public at a House Transportation Committee hearing on Wednesday."

The Boeing we know and love is not today's Boeing in my book. That Boeing died when they decided to move the company HQ to Chicago, and that is when the problems with the 787 and 737 Max programs began.

I would argue that the problem goes back to the merger with McDonnell Douglas in 1997 when they lost their last domestic competitor. The result is a monopoly being overseen by a bunch of lazy government bureaucrats that (not to be taken literally) drink from the same bottle and sleep with the same women.

You may be right about the Max never flying again. They may end up having to re-engineer the engines that caused the need for the MCAS software.

[I-5]

You might be right about the merger, Riv, though it could be argued that Airbus provides plenty of global competition. I tend to think it's the business-first approach by the suits in Chicago, instead of the actual airplane guys that Seattle Boeing was known for. But yeah, both factors could contribute.

[RiverDog]

You might be right about the merger, Riv, though it could be argued that Airbus provides plenty of global competition. I tend to think it's the business-first approach by the suits in Chicago, instead of the actual airplane guys that Seattle Boeing was known for. But yeah, both factors could contribute.

Global competition, yes, Airbus is a worthy competitor, and that does have the affect of keeping prices low. But we're talking about the relationship between Boeing and a domestic regulatory agency in the form of the FAA. Regulators have just one company to monitor, so it's only natural that they're going to get complacent, make a lot of personal relationships with those they're supposed to be overseeing, and become more of a player than an umpire. It's entirely possible that regulators at the FAA saw themselves as Americans protecting an American company that employs a heck of a lot of high paying American jobs.

Back when I went to college 45 or so years ago, I took a class in government (I was a business administration major), and I remember the prof talking about the life cycle of a government agency, with the first stage after the agency was created being characterized with a lot of vigor and enthusiasm regarding their mission and the final stage being nothing but a partner in crime of the industry they were supposed to regulate. At least from what I can see from my remote location, the FAA fits this life cycle like a glove.

[RiverDog]

I see where the CEO of Boeing has been fired. I wonder if anyone in the FAA will be disciplined over this incident? (sarcasm intended) Have they not been complicit in this matter as well?

I'm not singing the praises of private industry as it has its warts (the fired CEO is getting a $20M golden parachute), but that's one of the differences between it and the government, particularly the federal government. If somebody screws up in private industry, they get fired, but if someone screws up in government, the worst that happens to them is that they get transferred.

A long time ago when I was in college, my roommate's dad was the comptroller at the Walla Walla District of the Corps of Engineers, the agency responsible for building the dams on the lower Snake, and I teased his dad about the collapse of the Teton Dam that had happened recently. The old man roared back at me in an absolute rage that I didn't expect, told me in no uncertain terms that the Corps didn't build that dam, that it was the Bureau of Reclamation, and that his people told the Bureau NOT to build that dam there. It was a catastrophe that killed 14 and destroyed hundreds of millions of dollars worth of property. But even though there were huge errors made, no one lost their job over it.

And people wonder why I don't trust the government to run our health care system....

[I-5]

Thanks for sharing. I hadnt heard the news abot the CEO’s ouster until now. He definitely has to accept responsibility, but it’s also ironic that the board fired him, but can’t fire themselves, since I’m more than certain they were fully behind the rush to bring the plane to market ASAP to stop the losses to the A320 Neo. I also think you were right about the problems starting before the move to Chicago:

“Peter Lemme, an engineer at Boeing for 16 years before leaving in 1997, said the shift began more than two decades ago, culminating with the 1997 acquisition of McDonnell Douglas. “It was was really the Douglas management that infiltrated the Boeing philosophy.”

I’m a bit surprised you’d tease someone about a dam accident that killed people, but maybe i dont understand the context properly. As for the FAA, I agree heads should roll there, too, but the reality is Boeing has owned that agency, and more than a few politicians, for such a long time. Boeing is in the biggest existensial crisis in its history, and i think 2020 will be a defining year for the company.

[RiverDog]

I’m a bit surprised you’d tease someone about a dam accident that killed people, but maybe i dont understand the context properly. As for the FAA, I agree heads should roll there, too, but the reality is Boeing has owned that agency, and more than a few politicians, for such a long time. Boeing is in the biggest existensial crisis in its history, and i think 2020 will be a defining year for the company.

Not that it's an excuse, but that was back when I was pretty young, around 21-22 years old, and it was a pretty tasteless action on my part and certainly why the old man got so mad at me. I didn't get my sensitivity until way later in life, after I got out of college. But to be fair, the same old man used to get pissed off at us kids and tell us to go play in the freeway, so in some respects, he deserved it. My point was that his statement occurred before the investigation had revealed so many flaws in the siting and engineering of the dam.

You're exactly right about Boeing owning the FAA. It's what happens when you combine a monopoly with a mature government agency. You're also right about the board of directors. In theory, they answer to the stock holders and if me and everyone else that owns stock in a company took seriously those ballot cards we get in the mail and cast informed votes, it might work. But the reality is that they answer to their stock price, so only as it relates to drops due to negative publicity as they are experiencing now do they have a genuine sense of social responsibility.

As far as what happens with Boeing, they'll undergo a much needed shake-up at all levels, but the unfortunate thing is that there's going to be a lot of hard working, innocent employees that will lose their jobs over this.

[I-5]

I probably said or did as many insensitive things at 21 (I’m 53 now), so yeah I get it. He definitely sounded like the ‘get off my lawn’ type and then some. We all eventually become that guy

People will lose their jobs simply because the company made a huge miscalculation on the Max program by shady practices that killed hundreds of people in the name of corporate greed - all legal of course. They simply can’t afford to keep making planes they can’t deliver and therefore get paid for. I still think the Max will not get the-certified without a major re-design beyond software, and/or scrap it entirely. Ironically, they already had a better airframe in the discontinued 757, which has a higher landing gear that can accommodated the larger engines without having to move their location on the wings. I’m sure it would have cost more to redesign the wings, update the avionics, get re-certified, and the-train pilots. But it would have been a more sound design for safety sake. That’s capitalism when you don’t have a higher mission than pleasing the stock price.