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It seems weird to see Benson Mayowa or worse seeing Carlos Dunlap or others dropping back in coverage for underneath routes when a run is "faked" but this happens when using a Bear Front defensive alignment/scheme. The Bear Front helps us shut down the opponents running game consistently but can open up the other teams passing game (depending on our pass coverage scheme being used with the Bear).

From PFF publishing :

The NFL today majors in zone runs. Seventy-five percent of the league calls zone run concepts — inside or outside zone — over half the time when running on early downs outside of their own red zone and the opponent’s red zone.

The three teams with head coaches from Sean McVay’s coaching tree (the Los Angeles Rams with McVay himself, the Green Bay Packers with Matt LaFleur and the Cincinnati Bengals with Zac Taylor), which is famous for a reliance on outside zone, look poised to make the playoffs.

NFL defenses are thus presented with a clear problem: How does one go about stopping zone runs? As observed by PFF’s Seth Galina and Diante Lee on the excellent Two High Podcast, one in-vogue solution for defenses is to implement more Bear fronts.

After a dip in usage between the 2016-2018 seasons, Bear fronts have made a resurgence, being called on roughly 12% of early-down snaps between the 20-yard lines over the past three seasons. The idea behind the Bear front, named after the famous ‘85 Chicago Bears 46 defense, is to put many big bodies in the center of the defensive line.

For zone runs, specifically, this prevents the offensive line from getting double teams and thus being able to climb to the second level. The theory is this allows linebackers to run free and create better results against zone runs. Canonically, a Bear front is done with two defensive tackles as three-techniques (outside shoulder of the guard) and one as a zero-technique (nose tackle). This is also known as a 3-0-3 alignment.

Here, we'll investigate this central claim — that Bear fronts better defend zone runs — and determine what other strengths and weaknesses are associated with the defensive alignment.

For this purpose, we will be expanding the definition of a Bear front from a 3-0-3 to generally having three defensive linemen between the inside shoulders of the offensive tackles. This will hopefully capture the minutia of slight variations in defensive play calls and alignments that all reach the same end: having three big bodies in the center of the defensive line. Explicitly, this will be snaps in which the defense has three down linemen between, and including, either 4i player.

Does the Bear Front Work?

From a cursory view, it does work. Bear fronts have accomplished what they are designed to do on the tin in modern football. On early downs inside the 20-yard lines, offenses that run a zone run against a Bear front perform worse by roughly 0.05 expected points added (EPA) per attempt than when running against different fronts.

This doesn’t nearly pass the bar for a full statistical verification and estimation of the causal effect of bear fronts on zone runs. However, this evidence — along with the presence of a physical, schematic explanation of the phenomena — creates a strong argument for there being some causal relationship between the two. So we’ll say yes, Bear fronts are effective at stopping zone runs.

Aside from the benefit of stopping zone runs, we can also expect Bear fronts to schematically provide some benefits against play action off zone action for much the same reason. Bear fronts allow the linebackers to keep their noses clean, which allows them to better robot and get back to their landmarks following the play fake.

Analytically, if this was the case, it would be a massive boon considering the massive amounts of evidence pointing to the overall effectiveness of play-action passes on early downs. So, anything to mitigate their effectiveness would be tremendous.

This schematic expectation is also borne out in the data. PFF started tracking the run concept attached to play-action passes only in 2019, so we are working with smaller samples (203 inside zone passes against Bear fronts and 551 outside zone passes against Bear fronts). For outside zone passes, this is decent evidence for causality, as it does line up with our physical and schematic expectations. It is weakened, however, by the results of inside zone action passes, which are much more effective against Bear fronts than other alignments.

The most reasonable explanation that comes to mind is that the types of pass concepts called off each action being better or worse against the coverages behind bear fronts is an immense confounding factor rather than the front itself.

It is worth mentioning that one of the anticipated schematic issues of a Bear front is that it will be weak against gap runs, such as power and counter. The motivation behind this is that the down blocking offensive line has a better angle on the defensive linemen, thus causing better aggregate play results.

This expectation is only somewhat confirmed. Against power runs, there is functionally no difference between running against Bear fronts and running against other fronts. Bear fronts tend to have heavier box counts — more on that later — and thus we expect them to perform better against most runs.

So, a result where outcomes are the same is a weak point in the prior confirmation favor. The results of counter runs work opposite to our expectations, and this is perhaps the result of Bear fronts being in a better position to exploit potential issues with multiple offensive linemen — or it may just be noise. Either way, this is at best inconclusive evidence of a causal relationship between Bear fronts and worse outcomes when defending gap runs.
What is Associated with Bear Fronts?

A useful way of understanding defensive structure at a basic level is numbers and angles. If a defense has more people in one spot than the offense, it will probably get a stop — and vice versa. If the offense is able to get outside of the defense, it probably won’t get a stop — and vice versa.

With this in mind for Bear fronts, the defense still needs defenders dedicated to protecting the edges lest the offense is able to get around them. Additionally, the defense still typically needs two linebackers on the field to assure that the unit has advantageous numbers in the hole the running back chooses. Both of these paradigms lead to naturally higher box counts for Bear fronts:
The coaching adage “the coverage dictates the front” — which likely originates from Sun Tzu in the Art of War — means that the coverage on a given play limits what fronts can accompany it as a result of their overall structure. As an example, if a defense wants to run traditional Cover 2, it cannot employ a front where a safety lines up on the line of scrimmage since they will never be able to get to their landmark in the deep half of the field. With this in mind, what coverages allow defenses to run Bear fronts?

If you correctly answered one-high coverages, you get to have extra leftover Halloween candy tonight. The one-high coverages — Cover 1 and Cover 3 — allow defenses to bring an extra defender down into the box, making them natural choices to accompany Bear fronts. This does, of course, have its drawbacks.


We have evidence that higher box counts lead to worse outcomes in the passing game for defenses. And for Bear fronts specifically, their condensed nature can make it difficult for linebackers to reach their landmarks in Cover 3. If the defense is running Cover 1, it can also put linebackers/dropping edge players in difficult angles to defend personnel mismatches. These facts do lead to an overall worse performance against the pass.

The difference in the ability to defend the pass is staggering — one by a factor of eight — but it would be rudimentary to attribute all of this to Bear fronts. Based on the natural schematic implications, we can say some of it certainly is, but this is heavily dependent on the personnel of either team in a given situation, as well as the specific pass concept called.

Some pass concepts work better against Cover3 or Cover 1 in the first place, and they get worse with the additional impedances of a Bear front. But these disadvantages can be neutralized if a team happens to have Bobby Wagner on its roster.

So, we can say that Bear fronts likely perform worse against the pass than other fronts, but exactly how much worse it is depends on many external factors.

Some useful terms applicable for Defensive line alignments.

3 Technique
Arguably, the most well-known alignment technique is 3-tech. 3-technique is the premier interior pass-rushing alignment in every defense. While 4-3 defenses feature a player aligned in a 3-technique on most snaps, even 3-4 defenses use the alignment on most passing downs in today's NFL. Unlike the nose tackle, this alignment was designed to put the 3-tech one on one with an offensive lineman, allowing him to attack the B-gap (between guard and tackle), and the position’s success is predicated almost entirely on penetration. Whether defending the run or rushing the passer the 3-technique's focus is to wreak havoc in the backfield. Typically, the most athletic defensive interior players play this spot on passing downs regardless of their alignment on base downs.
3 Technique – An alignment and technique designation for interior defensive linemen. A 3 technique defensive lineman aligns on the outside shoulder of an offensive guard in the B-gap between the guard and tackle. The player is responsible for controlling and/or penetrating that gap (i.e., a one-gap player). The 3 technique is typically a defense’s premier interior pass rusher, relying on a combination of power, speed and quickness to beat potential double-teams and get to the quarterback. The 3 technique is commonly used in a 4-3 scheme.

0-Technique (3-4 NT) – Damon Harrison, New York Giants

The 0-technique, also called the Nose Tackle (NT), plays directly over the center or “head-up” on him. The 0-Tech is generally responsible for defending both gaps between the center and the guard (A-gaps) and is most often used in a 3-4 defensive front. His main job is to shut the run game down from pushing directly up the middle. To do this, he must control the center while often drawing a double team from either guard. That is why the heaviest players in the NFL typically play NT in the 3-4 front. They use a combination of their massive size and strength to anchor and win against blockers at the point of attack.

4 or 5-Technique (3-4 DE) – J.J. Watt, Houston Texans

Over the past few seasons, arguably no position in football has changed more than the 3-4 defensive end spot. With multiple-front defenses becoming more popular, combined with the fact that nickel defense has become the new base, 3-4 DEs find themselves playing all over the defensive front. In its most traditional form, much like the 0-technique, the position was a two-gap player, lining up directly over the offensive tackle and being responsible for the B and C gaps on his side of the formation. These players are typically long and stout with a skill set that allows them to stack big offensive tackles and shed them in order to make a play on the ball carrier. As the league has developed into more of a pass-happy landscape, so the position has developed into one that plays the pass first and run second, and the amount of two-gapping done in today's league is a fraction of what it was ten or more years ago. These defensive ends are moved around across multiple techniques and are far more likely to be operating in one gap and looking to penetrate into the backfield.
7 & 6-Techniques (4-3 DE, 3-4 OLB) – Khalil Mack, Oakland Raiders

Another area the NFL has changed is the way defensive coordinators try to get pressure on the quarterback. In the past, the league’s best pass rushers rushed from the right side, the quarterbacks “blind side”. Thus, the 7-technique was often used by teams that run a 4-3 on the left side of the defense as the run-stuffing, power end and in some fronts, was referred to as the “Closed End”. This player lined up in the gap between the right tackle and tight end, or head up on a tight end (6-tech) and was considered the edge-setter in the run game. This player had to be big and strong enough to stuff the run but athletic enough to beat the right tackle to cause pressure. While this is still certainly true for some defenses in today’s NFL, offenses are far more balanced now, and right tackles have to deal with just as many of the league's most fearsome pass rushers as their blindside counterparts. In fact, most of the league's most devastating pass rushers are seen weekly going against right tackles one-on-one.

Khalil Mack is the prototype for the new take on the position. In 2016, Mack lead the league in pass-rush productivity at 15.0 and while he is smaller in stature than 6/7-techniques of past, he is athletic enough to make a major impact in the run game. His 32 run stops ranked third among all edge defenders.
9-Technique (4-3 DE, 3-4 OLB) – Von Miller, Denver Broncos

The 9-technique is primarily a pass-rush specialized alignment and is only used outside of those confines by a handful of teams. Players lined up in 9-technique are far outside of the offensive tackle and rely heavily on speed and bend to crush the edge. With no blockers near the 9-technique they are able to hit full speed before either making a distinctive move or using a low center of gravity to bend the edge flying by the offensive tackle. In many cases, the offensive tackle will anticipate the speed rush and over commit to the outside making themselves susceptible for an inside counter move. It is a technique that comes in and out of vogue in the NFL, because all of that extra width opens up significant space along the line that can be exploited by the offense.

Von Miller can play in any edge technique, but he is the leagues prototypical rusher from the 9-technique. Miller uses a variety of moves to beat opposing offensive tackles but one that sticks out is his bull-rush. Miller will use his speed to get the offensive tackles feet moving and then devastate them converting his speed to a powerful bull-rush. Almost 28 percent of Miller’s 79 pressures in 2016 came from the bull-rush.

From "Inside the Pylon-2014" Pass Coverages:

Man and zone coverages

Man coverage

This is straight-forward – each pass defender will be assigned an offensive player to cover. He will line up across from that player and follow him anywhere on the field. In press coverage he will play on the line of scrimmage and attempt to jam or re-route him – basically, hitting him – in order to disrupt the receiver’s route before it begins. This can upset the designed timing of the play. Such contact is only legal within five yards of the line of scrimmage (the so-called “chuck zone”). In off man, the pass defender will line up anywhere from 2 to 12 yards away from the receiver, depending on the situation and play call, and attempt to mirror his actions and stick with him in space. In modern defenses, teams have code words that allow defensive players to “pass off” assignments to each other, incorporating zone concepts to disrupt route combinations designed to defeat man coverage. For example, if the receivers cross paths, thereby creating a natural “pick,” the defenders might switch rather than stay with their initial men.

Zone coverage

Defenders are assigned to an area of the field rather than a specific opponent and are expected to cover pass defenders who run through the area. Zone defenses are considered “safer” because they are less vulnerable to individual lapses, but they are susceptible to short completions. There are also pockets of empty space or “seams” between zones that offenses can exploit. Zones tend to be stronger against the run since it is easier for zone defenders to look into the backfield, whereas man defenders must keep track of their assigned receiver. In modern defenses, especially in the Bill Belichick/Nick Saban coaching tree, zone defenders are often encouraged to read keys and “look for work” (by aggressively covering players in their zone), thus incorporating some man concepts into the zone defense. The zone assigned to a player can be of various depths. “Deep zones” are far from the line of scrimmage, typically 15-20 yards off, and the player assigned to the deep zone is responsible for making sure no one gets past him downfield. “Underneath” zones are closer to the line of scrimmage, typically 5-15 yards off. The “flats” are wide zones extending all the way to the sideline and up to 10 yards from the line of scrimmage.

One-deep safety shells

Cover 1

In Cover 1, also known as “man-free,” the free safety plays a deep zone in the middle of the field. The cornerbacks and underneath defenders play man-to-man coverage. With five man defenders and the free safety – assuming a four-man rush – the defense has an extra unassigned man. That player (usually a linebacker or strong safety) can blitz the quarterback, “bracket” (double-team) a dangerous middle-of-the-field receiver, or play a “robber” role by lurking in an underneath zone and reading the quarterback. Cover 1 defenses can be vulnerable to big plays if they don’t have a free safety with a lot of range along with good man coverage cornerbacks and linebackers. Even for teams that play a lot of zone, Cover 1 is a common third-down defense, as the reward (forcing a punt with a stop) outweighs the risk (giving up a big play).

Cover 3

On the surface, Cover 3 looks like Cover 1; there are corners on the outside, a free safety in the deep middle, and the strong safety and linebackers underneath. But while Cover 1 is a man-to-man defense, Cover 3 is a zone defense. The cornerbacks are responsible for the WRs all along the sideline, including deep, but they have safety help to the inside if a receiver runs an in-cut or cross. The linebackers and strong safety play zone coverage underneath. Cover 3 has the benefits of a zone defense – with three deep defenders, it’s not vulnerable to the big play, it puts a safety in the box to help guard against the run, and the underneath zones protect against crossing routes that can stymie man coverage. Moreover, the outside corners play man-to-man against many of the routes, so it’s stouter against short receiving routes than most zone defenses. This combination has made it popular in recent years, most recently when the Seahawks rode a modified Cover 3 to the Super Bowl XLVIII Championship.


Two-Deep Safety Shells

Cover 2

This is a zone defense where the two deep safeties each occupy one deep half of the field’s width. The cornerbacks cover a flat or curl zone underneath, with the linebackers occupying underneath zones. The safeties don’t need as much range as in one-deep safety sets, since each only covers his half of the deep zone. The corners don’t need as much speed either, since they aren’t responsible for deep men. They do have to be strong tacklers and stout run defenders given that both safeties play deep and are subsequently not well positioned to help against the run. The Cover 2 defense has fallen out of favor in recent years, as modern offenses are savvy enough to attack the “seams” between the zones or overload the deep safeties by sending multiple receivers into one zone.

Thanks for posting these. Good stuff. I've been reading up on Donatell and Fangio's use of bear fronts.

We used the Bear front to try to get pressure on the QB, not stop the run.
It was implemented when we were the worst performing Defense in the league on pace to be the all time worst.
Dropping DE's into coverage allowed LBs and DB's the chance to use their quickness on the OL and add pressure.
It didn't work very well because when the QB got rid of the ball quickly our DE's don't have the athleticism to cover RBs or slot receivers.
It did allow Adams to get a lot of sacks and Wagner blitzed more that year than he had in his previous career.
Basically it was used to try to make up for the talent deficit on Defense and especially so the pass rush.

Opinions vary but this alignment did enhance Adams ability to be in the box if not on the LOS at the snap of the ball. This alignment basically is a variation of a 3 DL - 4 LB scheme which was often utilized for short yardage goal line stands because it closes most gaps for a RB to slip through. Using just two off the ball LB (Wagner/Brooks) we sub in two DE's (instead of two outside LB as in a normal 3-4 base stance) to take a 4 technique inside position and with Dunlap wide as a 9 technique pass rusher. When overused it exposes pass coverage allowing a quick reading QB to drop the pass over the coverage of your not so nimble DEs. But this year unlike the latter half of 2020 we started Adams further back from the LOS and "faking" coverage before blitzing...Adams is more explosive off the LOS ...not starting back in LB territory.

The 46 was developed by Buddy Ryan when he was DC of the Bears.
They had an embarrassment of talent on their DL and could use this front effectively. As well, it was new so Offenses didn't know how to mitigate its effectiveness
and attack it successfully. That we went back to using it showed that we were desperate for help along the DL, and we for the most part still are.

Not a move of desperation to remedy a lack of talent...it addresses a scheme to stop the zone running of McVay and the Rams as well as others in the NFL today. A couple of other DE/LB from our Seahawk past don't like the scheme and blame some of it from making our pass rush look bad.


LB Tatupu


Like hosts Bob Stelton and Dave Wyman, Tatupu also said he is over seeing the Seahawks drop their best pass rushers into coverage.

“I don’t ever want to see (defensive ends Carlos) Dunlap or Darrell Taylor in coverage again,” he said. “It’s not because they can’t do it, it’s because they’re so good at rushing the passer … It’s tough when you see them in the flats and it’s like, man, we should be sending him forward.”

DE Avril


Dave Wyman, a former NFL linebacker who is now a commentator on Seahawks radio broadcasts, asked Avril if Seattle’s defensive scheme, which was slightly different than in years past, attributed to the lack of sacks, especially by defensive ends.

“Oh, most definitely,” Avril said. “It’s kind of a hybrid 3-4 type of situation. I’m pretty sure this is the most Carlos Dunlap has dropped back into coverage in his whole entire career.”

Dunlap has been one of the more consistent defensive ends in football since entering the league in 2010, but the Seahawks reduced his snaps this season and he was often seen dropping into coverage. Avril doesn’t agree with that kind of usage.

“Listen, we don’t get paid to go backwards, we get paid to go forwards and get after the quarterback,” he said of defensive ends.

That kind of approach, Avril said, “plays a big role in the lack of production” when it comes to tallying sacks, quarterback hits and pressures.

“When you’ve got these guys dropping back maybe 40% of the time, 30% of the time, you can’t get in the groove of the game,” he said. “You can’t keep throwing your fastball (at the offensive line) and then throw a curve or a changeup for your guy that you’re going up against if you’re dropping back into coverage from time to time.”

When it comes to sacks, Avril thinks this altered defensive scheme limited the production, but he understands why Seattle changed things up.

“But for the guys up front, and also we can tell on the back end because they go hand in hand, if you’re not getting sacks, then guess what? You’re probably getting torched over (the) top of the defense,” he said.

Avril said the Seahawks altered their defensive concepts because of Adams, even if it ultimately didn’t work out for him or the defensive line when it comes to rushing the quarterback.

“I think changing up the defense was actually to help Adams out being around the line of scrimmage a little bit more and being able to blitz a little bit more, just with a different front,” he said. “In a 4-3 like they were running last year, guys are moving laterally, so you can get gassed from time to time, but Adams was always able to help. But when you go to a 3-4, you’re kind of gapped out, meaning there aren’t that many holes in the offensive line when guys are penetrating.”

At the end of the day, Avril said the new defense didn’t allow the Seahawks’ top playmakers to be as productive or disruptive as they were in 2020.

It was brought in by us when our Defense was on pace to being the worst in NFL history and had a
non existent pass rush. It was a desperate attempt to change things up to get pressure on the QB.
We’d seen and been successful against McVeys types of Offenses in previous years when we had the
talent to do so, so the 46 Defense against him suggestion isn’t valid.

NorthHawk wrote:It was brought in by us when our Defense was on pace to being the worst in NFL history and had a
non existent pass rush. It was a desperate attempt to change things up to get pressure on the QB.
We’d seen and been successful against McVeys types of Offenses in previous years when we had the
talent to do so, so the 46 Defense against him suggestion isn’t valid.

Since you don't identify when your talking about a "given" year...the defensive change in schemes for using the bear front alignment in its modified form was proposed by Norton last year (2020) and helped turn around our defense last year but this year it was a bit more exposed as opponents study film and made adjustments.

Film Breakdown: Understanding Basics of Seahawks 'Bear' Front
In the past three weeks, Seattle's defense has evolved from a liability into a suddenly formidable unit. What's been the secret? Schematic changes have played a role, including using "bear" fronts more frequently than any time previously in the Pete Carroll era.

Corbin K. Smith
Dec 3, 2020

Over the past three weeks, the Seahawks have taken a complete 180 degree turn on defense, transitioning from league laughingstock into a suddenly formidable unit.

Only a month ago, Seattle found itself on pace to obliterate Green Bay's record for passing yards given up by nearly 1,000 yards. Through the first half of the season, they had surrendered over 360 net passing yards per game, allowing opposing quarterbacks to carve them up at will.

But since halftime of a Week 10 loss to the Rams, the Seahawks have been firing on all cylinders defensively thanks to an invigorated pass rush and improving secondary play. Over the past 10 quarters, they've allowed 45 combined points, including holding the Eagles to 17 points in a win last Monday night.

While there's no question the addition of defensive end Carlos Dunlap and improving chemistry in the defensive backfield have been catalysts for the rapid turnaround. after being the scapegoat during Seattle's first half struggles, defensive coordinator Ken Norton Jr. also deserves praise for schematic adaptations that have played a role in the much improved play on that side of the ball.

Most notably, the Seahawks have been deploying "bear" fronts featuring three defensive tackles, two edge rushers, and two off-ball linebackers with increasing frequency. When asked about the adjustment, coach Pete Carroll credited Norton for getting the most out of the team's personnel defensively, including safety Jamal Adams and linebacker Jordyn Brooks.

"You have seen us adapt to our personnel and we have -we have enough background that we can do a lot of things," Carroll elaborated. "We have been through so much over the years and I think Kenny [Norton] is exhibiting that to you [through] the use of our talent. And Jamal's part of it, Jordyn [Brooks] coming to us as well is part of it. And absolutely it fits, like we have said to you, about Carlos, his work as a nine technique which puts him outside edge on, to the field in our defense, puts him exactly where he can be really most effective."

How does the "bear" front work? Up front, the Seahawks have a nose tackle in 0-tech alignment head up across from the center. Two other defensive tackles line up in 3-tech or sometimes 4i-alignment either shading the B-gap or the inside shoulder of the opposing tackle. On the outside, two defensive ends/hybrid linebackers are split out wide in 9-alignment and can either rush the quarterback or drop into coverage.
This season, Poona Ford has primarily played the nose tackle role, while Jarran Reed, L.J. Collier, and Rasheem Green have been seeing most of the snaps at the 3-tech spots and Dunlap or Benson Mayowa has been wide at one of the end spots. K.J. Wright, playing the SAM linebacker role, has normally been at the other wide-9 position off edge.

While Adams has still been dropping back into two-deep safety looks, playing "robber" assignments, and handling man-to-man obligations in coverage, his greatest strength lies in his ability to be disruptive in the box. Bear fronts allow Seattle to shift him closer to the line of scrimmage, thus creating flexibility to blitz him in a number of different ways and get downhill as a run defender.

When he hasn't been occupying the WILL linebacker role, Brooks has been gradually been earning more snaps and improving by week. Though he's made his share of mistakes, the first-round pick out of Texas Tech has flashed his 4.5 40-yard dash speed chasing down ball carriers and covering tight ends and running backs in coverage, making him an ideal fit for the position in those 5-2 looks.

With Brooks and occasionally Adams joining Bobby Wagner as the other off-ball linebacker, Wright has found a home at the SAM linebacker spot. Playing off the edge more than he has at any point in his career, he's made several big run stops as of late, including corralling Cardinals quarterback Kyler Murray for a tackle for loss on a read option run. He's also been rushing the passer with greater frequency, producing 2.0 sacks in the last four games.

As Carroll noted, however, Dunlap's arrival is what has really brought everything together. At 6-foot-6, 285 pounds, the veteran offers the size, length, and athleticism Seattle covets at the LEO defensive end spot. Already with 4.0 sacks in four games, he's been equally impressive stopping opposing ground games, helping set the edge for one of the NFL's best run defenses.

"I'm thrilled that you can see it coming together, it's taken us a few weeks. We weren't quite there, we wanted to work with Bruce [Irvin] and that edge position and when we lost him we took a couple steps back to get kind of re-oriented, but I think the defense is really moving now and I'm really excited about where we're going."

With five games left to play, the Seahawks will certainly face opponents in the future where it's not conducive to use "bear" fronts as often as they did on Monday night. But given the vastly different strengths for this unit compared to the "Legion of Boom" defenses of the past, expect Carroll and Norton to continue scheming out of those looks to maximize on their personnel throughout the rest of the season.

We changed to the Bear front to get a pass rush. Period.
That in turn helped the Defense. It wasn’t implemented to counter McVey’s Offense but
rather as a desperate attempt to get pressure on the QB.
After Thirty plus years of using the 3-4 under Defense Pete was faced with the fact he didn’t have
the talent to run it successfully. The inability to address the pass rush for 3 years meant he had to
do something completely out of character for him. Sure, Norton was the DC, but he would not have
made any change of this magnitude without Pete’s direction.
It was desperation that drove the change, nothing less.